Introduction
This paper investigates whether earnings management has real consequences on subsequent corporate investments. My research question is motivated by the longstanding debate on whether investment should or do respond to the market assessment when it differs from the managerial own assessment of the marginal product of capital.
On one hand, Bosworth (1975) argues that managers should base the investment decisions on their own assessment of the marginal product of capital, thus ignore other participants in the market. On the other hand, to the extent that the capital market accepts a lower or higher rate of return, managers should invest until the marginal product of capital is equal to the market required rate of return (e.g., Fisher and Merton, 1984) .
Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company, or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers (e.g., Healy and Wahlen, 1999) . Prior evidence suggests that the capital market fixates on reported earnings, and thus, the market accepts a lower (higher) rate of return for firms with upward (downward) earnings management (e.g., Sloan, 1996; Xie, 2001; Bartov, Givoly and Hayn, 2002) . These two factors combined suggest that the market assessment of the underlying performance is different from the managerial own assessment in firms with earnings management. According to Bosworth's view, earnings management has no impact on future investment patterns and efficiency. According to Fisher and Merton, however, firms with upward (downward) earnings management are expected to invest more (less) in the subsequent period than an average firm.
In this paper, I use the extent of earnings management as a proxy for the deviation of the market assessment from the managerial own assessment in an attempt to examine whether investments respond to the market assessment when it differs from the managerial own assessment. Based on the measure of earnings management developed by Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005) , I find evidence consistent with the view that earnings management has an economically significant impact on subsequent corporate investment patterns. First, compared with an average firm, firms with the most aggressive accounting practices invest more and their investments are less sensitive to internal cash flows. Second, compared with an average firm, investments in firms with the least aggressive accounting practices are more sensitive to internal cash flows. The differential sensitivity of investment to internal cash flows between firms with the most (least) aggressive accounting practices and an average firm is associated with the fact that firms with most (least) aggressive accounting practices raise more (less) external capitals.
Furthermore, I find some evidence that earnings management may induce investment inefficiency in the future. First, firms with the most aggressive accounting practices experience a sharper decline in future performance than an average firm, and, the decline in future performance increases with the level of investment. As inefficient investment policy usually result in a decline in future accounting performance, the evidence together suggests a possibility of overinvestment for firms with the most aggressive accounting practices. Second, while firms with the least aggressive accounting practices also experience a sharper decline in future performance than an average firm, the decline in future performance decreases with the level of investment for this group of firms, which suggests a possibility of underinvestment for firms with the least aggressive accounting practices.
The finding in this paper has some important implications. First, although there is evidence that earnings management occurs prior to equity issuance (e.g., Teoh et al., 1998a; Rangan, 1998) , my findings suggest that financial reporting not only has an impact on financing decision but also an economically significant impact on real investing decisions. Results are robust when external equity financing firms are excluded. Second, the cross-sectional evidence in this paper indicates that the market assessment matters for corporate investment even when it differs from the managerial own assessment. Finally, this paper is the first study that provides empirical evidence that earnings management through accounting manipulations induces investment inefficiency in the future, thus shedding some light on the real costs of earnings management. This paper is closely related to Polk and Sapienza (2006) . They suggest that assumption: the market misprices firms according to the level of investment, conclusion: managers want to boost the short-term stock price by catering to investor sentiment: similar conclusion: overpriced firms over-invest and underpriced firms under-invest.
DIFFERENT INTERPRETATION:
Assumption: the market misprices firms because of the financial reporting Conclusion: overpriced firms are less financial constrained and underpriced firms are more financially constrained. This paper is also related to two papers in the accounting area. Gary and XXX (2006) documents that higher earnings quality reduces the information asymmetry and increases the efficiency. This paper suggests that low earnings quality firms experience inefficiency.
Frank (2007) documents that firms with higher accruals are investment/growth firms. However, his interpretation cannot explain the relation between accruals and the sensitivity of investment to cash flows.
Need to derive some cross-sectional predictions to further support the story.
The paper is organized as the following. Section 2 discusses the background and related literature. Section 3 develops the hypothesis. Section 4 describes variable measurement and research design. Section 5 presents the main empirical results and section 6 discusses the efficiency implications. Section 7 concludes the paper.
II. Background and related literature
Earnings management can be broadly categorized into "real" earnings management and earnings management through accounting manipulations. Prior studies have provided evidence that managers engage in "real" earnings management, i.e., managers intentionally alter investment decisions to influence contemporaneous reported earnings. For example, Stein (1989) develops a model in which, faced with short-term market pressure, managers may forsake good investments, such as cut R&D and advertising spending, to boost current earnings. Bushee (1998) and Sugata (2006) provide empirical evidence consistent with such conjecture. My paper, however, differs fundamentally in that I am not interested in whether real investments are altered to achieve a certain reporting objective in the contemporaneous earnings but rather in whether earnings management through accounting manipulations has an impact on subsequent investment patterns and efficiency.
In traditional theories of corporate investments, the capital market is information efficient to the extent that the price of debt and equity incorporates all available information and accurately reflects the underlying economic performance. Under such a premise, financial reporting plays virtually no role in the cross-sectional variation in investment decisions. For example, neoclassical investment theory predicts that the only factor that matters for investment is Tobin's Q (e.g., Tobin, 1969) and the asymmetric information model developed by Myers and Majluf (1984) suggests that the cost of external capital is higher than the cost of internal funds, and thus, the pecking order for financing investment projects is internal funds first, followed by debt financing and finally equity financing. Furthermore, a substantial body of empirical evidence indicates that firms with a higher Tobin's Q and more internal cash flows tend to invest more in the cross section (surveyed in Hubbard, 1998 and Stein, 2001 ).
There is, however, a growing body of studies in accounting and behavioral finance suggesting that the market efficiency premise should be viewed with some skepticism (surveyed in Shleifer, 2000) . Thus, it is possible that the market assessment may differ from the managerial assessment. Most prior studies have adopted a time-series approach to address whether investment should or do respond to the market assessment when it differs from the managerial own assessment. The evidence, however, is rather mixed with respect to whether aggregate investments respond to the aggregate market assessment when it differs from fundamentals (e.g., Barro, 1990; Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1990; Blanchard, Rhee and Summers, 2000; Chrinko and Schaller, 2001 ).
On one hand, Blanchard et al. (2000) uses the time-series economy-wide data in the U.S.
and concludes that stock market valuation appears to play a limited role, given fundamentals, in the determination of investment decisions. On the other hand, Chirinko and Schaller (2001) uses economy-wide data in Japan and concludes that, given structural assumption about the fundamental and non-fundamental components of stock valuation, the market bubble has a significant effect on investment in fixed assets.
In contrast to the time-series approach in prior literature, I take a cross-sectional approach to address this debate. My cross-sectional approach is motivated by the wellestablished evidence that the capital market fixates on reported earnings (e.g., Sloan, 1996; Bartov, Givoly and Hayn, 2002) . If the capital market fixates on reported earnings, holding the level of reported performance, in a cross section, firms with the most aggressive accounting practices are likely to be overvalued relative to their fundamentals, whereas firms with the least aggressive accounting practices are likely to be undervalued relative to their fundamentals. This suggests that, in addition to the market fads or bubbles, the deviation between the market assessment and the managerial assessment could also originate from the information difference between managers and investors with respect to the extent of earnings management.
Baker, Stein and Wurgler (2002) also takes a cross-sectional approach. Their paper identifies a specific subset of firms in the cross section -equity-dependent firmsfor which investments are more sensitive to Tobin's Q. Because their paper doesn't identify a specific source of the non-fundamental components in stock prices, they use future returns as a proxy for the deviation of stock prices from fundamentals at the time of investment decisions. In contrast to their ex-post approach, I deliberately take an exante approach in which I use the extent of earnings management prior to investment decisions as the proxy for the deviation of the market assessment from the managerial own assessment.
While prior literature has provided some evidence of upward earnings management prior to equity issuances (e.g., Teoh et al. 1998a; Teoh et al., 1998b; Rangan, 1998) , it is, however, ex-ante uncertain whether a higher propensity to issue new shares necessarily implies a higher level of investments in the next period because firms can always put the proceeds into cash and securities rather than investing in fixed assets or R&D. As a matter of fact, according to Blanchard, Rhee and Summers (1993) , when stock price is high, the best strategy is to issue new shares, but to use the proceeds not for investment, but for lending at riskless rate. This is because investing in capital drives down marginal product, but leading at riskless rate is equivalent to investing in a constant technology.
This paper is related to a few strands of literature. First, the investment patterns following earnings management may explain why firms with a higher level of external finance have worse performance in the long-run (e.g., Loughran and Ritter, 1995; Spies and Affleck-Graves, 1999; Billet, Flannery and Garfinkel, 2001; Richardson and Sloan, 2003) . Second, the link between the quality of financial reporting and asset pricing is traditionally interpreted as evidence that high quality financial reporting reduces the information asymmetry component of the cost of capital (e.g., Botosan, 1997; Francis, LaFond, Olsson and Schipper, 2004) . The evidence in this paper, however, suggests that one aspect of the quality of financial reporting -earnings management -may have an impact on asset pricing through an alternative channel. In particular, earnings management impacts real investment decisions, which, in turn, have implications on future cash flows (e.g., Lambert, Leuz and Verrecchia, 2006) . Finally, my paper contributes to the new strand of literature that documents the real consequences of financial reporting choices (e.g., Kanodia et al., 2000 and Fairfield, Pinkowitz and Tang, 2007) .
III. Hypothesis Development
The neoclassical model of investment predicts that a firm will invest up to a level where the marginal adjustment and purchase cost of investing is equal to the managerial assessment of the marginal profitability of capital (e.g., Lucas and Prescott, 1971; Mussa, 1977) . Under the premise that financial markets are informational efficient (the prices of equity and debt accurately reflect fundamentals), the managerial assessment is always identical to the market assessment and Tobin's q is a perfect proxy for the managerial assessment of the underlying economic performance.
The market assessment, however, may differ from managerial assessment either due to stock market bubbles or fads or due to the information difference between investors and managers. Prior studies use time-series data on aggregate investment and aggregate stock valuation and finds mixed evidence on whether stock market bubbles or fads impact corporate investments. My paper takes a cross-sectional approach and uses the extent of earnings management as a proxy for the deviation of the market assessment from the managerial own assessment in the cross section.
If investment only responds to the managerial own assessment of the underlying economic performance (e.g., Bosworth, 1975) , it leads to the following two predictions.
First, controlling for other determinants of investment, investment level will be invariant to the extent of earnings management in the prior period. Second, in a cross-section, as a proxy for managerial assessment, Tobin's Q has a larger measurement error in firms with the most (least) aggressive accounting practices than an average firm. Thus, the sensitivity of investment to Tobin's Q is likely to be attenuated in those two groups of firms.
However, if investment responds to the market valuation regardless of whether it differs from managers' assessment (e.g., Fisher and Merton, 1984) , managers will invest until the marginal adjustment and purchase cost of investing is equal to the market The premise under Hypothesis 1 is that firms have unlimited funds for their investment projects. However, in practice, the availability of external or internal funds affects investment decisions. For example, in Myers and Majluf (1984) , the external capital is more costly than internal funds because managers have better information than investors regarding the quality of investment projects. As a result, firms invest more when there are more internal funds available (e.g., Fazzari, Hubbard, and Peterson, 1988; Blanchard, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 1994) .
Interestingly, there is an interaction between the costly-external-finance model and managers' information advantage in the extent of earnings management. If investors can only price-protect themselves to the extent of average earnings management (e.g., Bar-Gill and Bebchuk, 2003) , given the level of reported profitability, for firms with the largest upward earnings management, the external cost of capital market is lower than the average firm. If the overvaluation is sufficiently large, the cost of external capital may be lower than the cost of internal funds, which encourages those firms to raise more external capital. Thus, investments in firms with the most aggressive accounting practices will be less sensitive to internal cash flows. Finally, if the sensitivity of investment to internal funds is related to the extent of earnings management, it should work through the effect of earnings management on external financing activities. Although there is some evidence that most aggressive accounting practices are associated increased likelihood of IPOs and SEOs in the subsequent periods (e.g., Teoh et al. 1998a; Teoh et al., 1998b; Rangan, 1998) , there is, however, no empirical evidence on whether firms with the least aggressive accounting practices try to avoid the need for external capitals in the subsequent period. This leads to my third hypothesis:
H3: Holding the level of reported performance, compared with an average firm, firms with the least aggressive accounting practices raise less external capital in the following period.
explanation for why the sensitivity of investment to internal funds is not monotonically increasing in the extent of financial constraints (e.g., Kaplan and Zingales, 1997 and .
Hypothesis 3 should be viewed as a compliment to my hypothesis 2 regarding the effect of earnings management on real investment decisions. 2 My paper is somewhat different from prior studies on the association between upward earnings management and subsequent equity issuances. First, the association between earnings management and external financing transactions is not limited to external equity transactions but is applicable to all forms of external financing transactions, in the form of both debt and equity. Second, while the existing literature predicts an unconditional positive association between aggressive accounting practices and subsequent financing patterns, my paper predict a negative association between the least aggressive accounting practices and the amount of external finance, conditional on the level of reported performance.
If firms with most conservative accounting practices have to forgo some profitable projects to avoid the need for external financing, one important question remains on why some managers even engage in conservative accounting practices. 3 The short answer is that there are certain firm-specific and institutional constraints on reporting earnings upward period after period. First, there is a substantial variation on the discretion available for managers to report earnings upward at a certain point of time.
For example, the accounting system is designed in such a way that the balance sheet accumulates the effects of previous optimistic bias in managers' financial reporting. As a result, constraints embedded in GAAP such as objectivity and conservatism, when properly enforced, should limit managers of firms with bloated balance sheets from managing earnings upward. For example, Barton and Simko (2003) find that firms with bloated balance sheets are more associated with increased odds of a negative earnings surprise. Their finding suggests that, all else equal, limited discretion constraints upward earnings management. Second, firm-specific corporate governance structures may constraint managers' ability to manage earnings upward. For example, Klein (2002) finds that board composition mitigates upward earnings management (also see Dechow et al., 1996) . Finally, managers in some firms may have incentives to engage in conservative aggressive accounting practices. For example, prior studies suggest that managers have incentives to portrait a gloomy picture of the fundamentals prior to stock or option inflows (Yermack, 1997; Aboody and Kasznik, 2000; Baker et al., 2003) .
IV. Sample, Measurement and Research Design

Measure of earnings management
One major task is to measure the extent of earnings management through accounting manipulations. Discretionary accrual models are standard in the literature to develop indices of earnings management. In this paper, it is essential to explicitly control for the reported performance in the measure of earnings management. One off-the-shell measure which explicitly control for reported profitability is the performance-adjusted discretionary accruals based on Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005) . By taking their measure, I hope to maximize the construct validity and minimize the measurement error in the empirical proxy for earnings management.
The first step is to calculate discretionary accruals from the following model,
following Guenther (1994), Teoh et al. (1998a and 1998b) , and Louis (2004):
where CA is the current accrual of firm i in year t, ΔSales is the annual change in sales for firm i in year t, and ΔAR is the annual change in accounts receivable for firm i in year t. The current accrual is the change in non-cash current assets minus the change in operating current liabilities. 4 All the variables are scaled by total assets as of year t-1.
The regression residual captures the discretionary accrual in year t, or the change in working capital in excess of what is expected given the change in cash sales.
The second step is to assign each firm to a portfolio based on year, industry membership and return on assets. 5 The performance adjustment is effected by deducting the average regression residual for all firms in the portfolio from the firm-specific regression residual in the first step. The resulting performance-adjusted discretionary accrual (DA it ) is used as a proxy for the extent of aggressive accounting practices.
The final step is to partition all firms into 5 quintiles based on the magnitude of performance-adjusted discretionary accruals for a specific year. 6 Firms in the bottom quintile of performance-adjusted discretionary accruals is classified as firms with the least aggressive accounting practices (MIN_DA = 1), whereas firms in the top quintile of performance-adjusted discretionary accruals as firms with the largest upward earnings management (MAX_DA = 1).
Research design
In order to assess whether investments respond to the market valuation when it is different from managers' assessment, I explicitly model the investment decision: In the external financing model, external finance is a function of Tobin's Q (Q it ), reported profitability (ROA it ) and indicator variables for earnings management. External finance includes both the debt issued and equity raised for a particular year. I use seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) to estimate the investment model and the external finance model simultaneously because managers may make financing and investing decisions jointly (e.g., Zeller, 1969) . Because the empirical tests uses panel data, the t-statistics for all explanatory variables are based on cluster-adjusted standard errors, which are robust to both serial correlation and cross-sectional correlation (e.g., Froot, 1989 and Williams, 2000) . 
Descriptive statistics
The final sample consists of 41,589 firm-year observations from 1988 to 2005
where information on all variables is available on the COMPUSTAT annual file. The data starts from 1988 because statements of cash flows are widely available after 1988.
All variables, both dependent and independent variables, are winsorized at both the top and the bottom one percentile. Firms in the financial industries are also excluded from the sample. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics on the full sample. Most of variables are in line with prior studies. For example, the median of return on assets is around 4%
and the mean Tobin's Q is 1.56. On average, annual capital expenditure and research and development expenses amount to 11% of assets and external financing activities provide 4% of asset base on an annual basis. Table 2 reports the correlation table for To gain a better idea about the characteristics of firms with the most aggressive accounting practices, the least aggressive accounting practices and other firms in the middle, I compare the three groups of firms on different dimensions. First, to gain insights into the validity of the measure of earnings management, I
V. Empirical results on investing and financing decisions
examine the future performance for the three different groups of firms based on DA t . The accounting system is designed in such a way that aggressive accounting practices through accruals are likely to reverse in the following period. Consistent with such a reversal, firms with the most aggressive accounting practices (MAX_DA t = 1) experience the sharpest decline in return on assets, as evident from a decline of 0.014 to 0.000 from period t to period t +1. Firms with the least aggressive accounting practices experience the sharpest increase in retune on assets in the next period, as evident from an increase of 0.012 to 0.018 from period t to period t +1.
Second, compared with an average firm, returns on assets are lower for firms with the least aggressive accounting practices and for firm with the most aggressive accounting practices. This suggests that, despite that the measure for earnings management explicitly controls for the reported performance, the control is imperfect.
Firms with the least aggressive accounting practices have a significantly higher level of working capitals than other firms in the prior period, which suggests that those firms have more bloated balance sheets. The pattern in the extent of bloated balance sheets is consistent with the interpretation that balance sheet acts as a constraint on managers to engage in aggressive accounting practices repeatedly. Firms with the most aggressive accounting practices experience the largest contemporary growth in sales, consistent with the interpretation in Fairfield et al. (2003) . In summary, both the correlation statistics in Table 2 and the descriptive statistics in Table 3 reinforce the need for control for other determinants of investments in examining the relationship between financial reporting and future investments. Table 4 reports the main empirical results on financial reporting and future investments. In the base model where there is no role for earnings management, investment is increasing in both investment opportunities and internally generated cash flows and these two variables are able to explain 17% of the cross-sectional variation in new investments. Compared with the base model, the quality of financial reporting is able to provide an incremental 18% explanatory power to explain the variation in investments in addition to investment opportunities and internally generated cash flows.
Per Table 4 Column 2, the coefficient on indicator variable Lag (MAX_DA) is 0.003 and is statistically significant (p-value = 0.021). Such a coefficient indicates that, ceteris paribus, when a firm with the most aggressive accounting practices starts with a beginning book value of $ 100m, it is likely to invest $300,000 more in fixed assets or R&D in the next period than an average firm. Both the interaction term between Lag (MAX_DA) and Q and the interaction term between Lag (MIN_DA) and Q are insignificant, which suggest that corporate investments are invariant to the extent of earnings management in the prior period. The empirical evidence is largely consistent with hypothesis 1 that investments respond to the market assessment when it differs from the managerial own assessment.
Furthermore, the interaction term between Lag(MAX_DA) and CASH is -0.045 ( p-value = 0.001), which suggests that investments in firms with the most aggressive accounting practices are significantly less sensitive to internal cash flows than an average firm. In contrast, the coefficient on the interaction between Lag(MIN_DA) and CASH is 0.018 (p-value = 0.046), which implies that investments in firms with the least aggressive accounting practices are significantly more sensitive to free cash flows.
To provide complimentary evidence on the differential sensitivity of investments to cash flows, Table 5 Table 4 and Table 5 combined indicates that aggressive accounting practices mitigate the costly-externalfinance constraints, whereas conservative accounting practices exacerbate the costlyexternal-finance constraints.
VI. Future Investment Efficiency
In this paper, the performance-adjusted discretionary accruals is used as a proxy for the deviation of the market assessment from the managerial own assessment. Thus, managers in firms with the most aggressive accounting practices take advantage of the overvaluation in the market assessment and invest more than an average firm, whereas managers in firms with the least aggressive accounting practices forego some of their profitable projects to avoid the need for external finance and, thus, their investment is more sensitive to internal cash flows. According to Jensen (2005) , firms with the most aggressive accounting practices are likely to over-invest compared with an average firm.
Furthermore, firms with the least aggressive accounting practices are likely to underinvest because they have to forego some profitable projects in order to avoid the need for external financing.
Aggressive (conservative) accounting practices, however, could just be means through which manager signal to investors about their true beliefs of the company. For example, aggressive (conservative) accounting practices signal that managers are optimistic (pessimistic) about the future profitability of the firm. If this is the case, from an efficiency perspective, firms should invest more in the period following aggressive accounting practices and less in the period following conservative accounting practices.
In order to differentiate these two alternative explanations and shed some light on the effect of earnings management on the efficiency of future investments, I examine the accounting performance following the investment decision. The idea is the following: an efficient investment policy will boost performance following the investment, while an investment policy that is sensitive to the non-fundamental noise in stock prices may undermine future performance (e.g., Jensen, 2005).
Future performance & investment efficiency
The objective of my first test is to compare the future performance of firms with the most and least aggressive accounting practices with an average firm. I model return on assets in period t + 1 as a function of return on assets in period t, level of accruals in period t and the indicator variables for firms with most aggressive accounting practices and firms with least aggressive accounting practices in period t -1. I include the current level of return on assets and accruals because prior literature has demonstrated that return on assets mean reverts and firms with high level of accruals experience a decline in the future performance (e.g., Freeman, Ohlson and Penman, 1982; Sloan, 1996) . If there is overinvestment in firms with the most aggressive accounting practices, the performance at time t +1 is expected to decline. Similarly, if there is under-investment for firms with the least aggressive accounting practices, the performance at time t + 1 is expected to decline as well. Table 6 reports the empirical results on return on assets in period t +1. I find that the indicator variable Lag (MAX_DA) has a coefficient of -0.008 (p-value = 0.007),
suggesting that firms with the most aggressive accounting practices perform worse than an average firm. The interaction term between LAG (MIN_DA) and ROA is significantly negative (coefficient = -0.077 and p-value = 0.021), suggesting that, holding the level of reported performance, firm with the least aggressive accounting practices perform worse than an average firm. The comparison of the future performance between firms with the most aggressive accounting practices and an average firm suggests that those firms may over-invest, whereas the comparison between firms with the least aggressive accounting practices and an average firm suggests that those firms my under-invest.
Investment level and investment efficiency
The objective of the second test is to examine explicitly whether the association between the level of investment at time t and the return on assets at time t +1 is consistent with the overinvestment (underinvestment) interpretation. More specifically, if firms with the most (least) aggressive accounting practices tend to over-invest (under-invest), firms that invest most (least) are likely to experience the sharpest decline in future performance.
I sort the group of firms with the most aggressive accounting practices into five quintiles conditional on the level of investment at time t. Table 7 Table 7 Panel B, I find that after controlling for current ROA, current accruals, and current investment, the interaction term between ROA and INVESTMENT is significantly negative with a coefficient of -0.243 (p-value = 0.005). I interpret the negative coefficient on the interaction term between the investment level and current return on assets as evidence that, within the group of firms with the most aggressive accounting practices, holding the level of current ROA constant, firms that invest more experience a sharper decline in future performance.
Similarly, I also sort the group of firms with the least aggressive accounting practices into five quintiles conditional on the level of investment at time t. Table 8 Panel A reports the descriptive statistics on the five quintiles and Table 8 Panel B presents the results from the multivariate regression analysis. Per Table 8 
VII. Conclusions
This paper uses the extent of earnings management as a proxy for the difference between the market assessment and managerial own assessment in the cross section and documents an interesting interaction between the extent of earnings management and future investment patterns and investment efficiency. In particular, I find that, compared with an average firm, firms with the largest upward earnings management have a higher level of investment and a lower sensitivity of investment to internal cash flows, whereas firms with the least aggressive accounting practices have investment that is more sensitive to internal cash flows. Furthermore, I find evidence consistent with the interpretation that firms with the most aggressive accounting practices tend to overinvest, whereas firms with the least aggressive accounting practices tend to under-invest.
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MAX versus Medium
Difference in median -0.005*** 0.000 0.079*** 0.020*** -0.006*** 0.068*** 0.085*** -0.14*** -0.010 ***significant at 0.01 level, ** significant at 0.05 level, and *** significant at 0.10 level (Compustat item 14) , deflated by beginning-of-year book value of assets (Compustat item 6). Discretionary accruals is the residual from the regression CA it = α + β (ΔSales it -ΔAR it ) + ε it , where CA is the current accrual of firm i in year t (Compustat item Δ (4-1) -Δ (5-34)) , Δ Sales is the annual change in sales for firm i in year t, ΔAR is the annual change in accounts receivable for firm i in year t, where all variables are scaled by beginning-of-year book value of total assets. The performance-adjusted discretionary accrual (DA) is the difference between the firm-specific discretionary accruals and the average discretionary accrual of a portfolio of firms matched on two-digit SIC codes and current return on assets. Lag (DA) is the performance-adjusted discretionary accrual in year t-1. Lag(MIN_DA) is an indicator variable, which takes the value of 1 if a firm is in the lowest quartile of performance-adjusted discretionary accruals and 0 otherwise. Lag(MAX_DA) is an indicator variable, which takes the value of 1 if a firm is in the highest quartile of performanceadjusted discretionary accruals and 0 otherwise. Investment opportunities (Q) is measured as the ratio of the market value to the replacement cost of the assets, where the market value is measured as the sum of the market value of the equity (Compustat item 24*199) and the value of debt (Compustat item 9 + 34) and the replacement cost of the assets is measured as the end-of-year book value of assets (Compustat item 6). Internally generated cash flows (CASH) is calculated as earnings before interest, tax, dividends (Compustat item 13) minus interest expense (Compustat item 15), tax expense (Compustat item 16) and dividend payments (Compustat item 127). External finance (XFIN) is the sum of the cash proceeds from the sale of common and preferred stock (Compustat item 108), the cash proceeds form the issuance of long-term debt (Compustat item 111) and the cash proceeds from the change in current debt (Compustat item 301), deflated by the beginning-of-year book value of assets (Compustat item 6). External finance (XFIN) is the sum of the cash proceeds from the sale of common and preferred stock (Compustat item 108), the cash proceeds form the issuance of long-term debt (Compustat item 111) and the cash proceeds from the change in current debt (Compustat item 301), deflated by the beginning-of-year book value of assets (Compustat item 6). Discretionary accruals is the residual from the regression CA it = α + β (ΔSales it -ΔAR it ) + ε it , where CA is the current accrual of firm i in year t (Compustat item Δ (4-1) -Δ (5-34)) , Δ Sales is the annual change in sales for firm i in year t, ΔAR is the annual change in accounts receivable for firm i in year t, where all variables are scaled by beginning-of-year book value of total assets. The performanceadjusted discretionary accrual (DA) is the difference between the firm-specific discretionary accruals and the average discretionary accrual of a portfolio of firms matched on two-digit SIC codes and current return on assets. Lag (DA) is the performance-adjusted discretionary accrual in year t-1. Lag(MIN_DA) is an indicator variable, which takes the value of 1 if a firm is in the lowest quartile of performance-adjusted discretionary accruals and 0 otherwise. Lag (MAX_DA) is an indicator variable, which takes the value of 1 if a firm is in the highest quartile of performance-adjusted discretionary accruals and 0 otherwise. Investment opportunities (Q) is measured as the ratio of the market value to the replacement cost of the assets, where the market value is measured as the sum of the market value of the equity (Compustat item 24*199) and the value of debt (Compustat item 9 + 34) and the replacement cost of the assets is measured as the end-of-year book value of assets (Compustat item 6). Internally generated cash flows (CASH) is calculated as earnings before interest, tax, dividends (Compustat item 13) minus interest expense (Compustat item 15), tax expense (Compustat item 16) and dividend payments (Compustat item 127). External finance (XFIN) is the sum of the cash proceeds from the sale of common and preferred stock (Compustat item 108), the cash proceeds form the issuance of long-term debt (Compustat item 111) and the cash proceeds from the change in current debt (Compustat item 301), deflated by the beginning-of-year book value of assets (Compustat item 6). Discretionary accruals is the residual from the regression CA it = α + β (ΔSales it -ΔAR it ) + ε it , where CA is the current accrual of firm i in year t (Compustat item Δ (4-1) -Δ (5-34)) , Δ Sales is the annual change in sales for firm i in year t, ΔAR is the annual change in accounts receivable for firm i in year t, where all variables are scaled by beginning-of-year book value of total assets. The performance-adjusted discretionary accrual (DA) is the difference between the firm-specific discretionary accruals and the average discretionary accrual of a portfolio of firms matched on two-digit SIC codes and current return on assets. Lag (DA) is the performance-adjusted discretionary accrual in year t-1. Lag(MIN_DA) is an indicator variable, which takes the value of 1 if a firm is in the lowest quartile of performance-adjusted discretionary accruals and 0 otherwise. Lag(MAX_DA) is an indicator variable, which takes the value of 1 if a firm is in the highest quartile of performance-adjusted discretionary accruals and 0 otherwise. Investment opportunities (Q) is measured as the ratio of the market value to the replacement cost of the assets, where the market value is measured as the sum of the market value of the equity (Compustat item 24*199) and the value of debt (Compustat item 9 + 34) and the replacement cost of the assets is measured as the end-of-year book value of assets (Compustat item 6). External finance (XFIN) is the sum of the cash proceeds from the sale of common and preferred stock (Compustat item 108), the cash proceeds form the issuance of long-term debt (Compustat item 111) and the cash proceeds from the change in current debt (Compustat item 301), deflated by the beginning-of-year book value of assets (Compustat item 6). Discretionary accruals is the residual from the regression CA it = α + β (ΔSales it -ΔAR it ) + ε it , where CA is the current accrual of firm i in year t (Compustat item Δ (4-1) -Δ (5-34)) , Δ Sales is the annual change in sales for firm i in year t, ΔAR is the annual change in accounts receivable for firm i in year t, where all variables are scaled by beginning-of-year book value of total assets. The performance-adjusted discretionary accrual (DA) is the difference between the firm-specific discretionary accruals and the average discretionary accrual of a portfolio of firms matched on two-digit SIC codes and current return on assets. Lag (DA) is the performance-adjusted discretionary accrual in year t-1. Lag(MIN_DA) is an indicator variable, which takes the value of 1 if a firm is in the lowest quartile of performance-adjusted discretionary accruals and 0 otherwise. Lag(MAX_DA) is an indicator variable, which takes the value of 1 if a firm is in the highest quartile of performance-adjusted discretionary accruals and 0 otherwise. Investment opportunities (Q) is measured as the ratio of the market value to the replacement cost of the assets, where the market value is measured as the sum of the market value of the equity (Compustat item 24*199) and the value of debt (Compustat item 9 + 34) and the replacement cost of the assets is measured as the end-of-year book value of assets (Compustat item 6). Internally generated cash flows (CASH) is calculated as earnings before interest, tax, dividends External finance (XFIN) is the sum of the cash proceeds from the sale of common and preferred stock (Compustat item 108), the cash proceeds form the issuance of long-term debt (Compustat item 111) and the cash proceeds from the change in current debt (Compustat item 301), deflated by the beginning-of-year book value of assets (Compustat item 6). Discretionary accruals is the residual from the regression CA it = α + β (ΔSales it -ΔAR it ) + ε it , where CA is the current accrual of firm i in year t (Compustat item Δ (4-1) -Δ (5-34)) , Δ Sales is the annual change in sales for firm i in year t, ΔAR is the annual change in accounts receivable for firm i in year t, where all variables are scaled by beginning-of-year book value of total assets. The performance-adjusted discretionary accrual (DA) is the difference between the firm-specific discretionary accruals and the average discretionary accrual of a portfolio of firms matched on two-digit SIC codes and current return on assets. Lag (DA) is the performance-adjusted discretionary accrual in year t-1. Lag(MIN_DA) is an indicator variable, which takes the value of 1 if a firm is in the lowest quartile of performance-adjusted discretionary accruals and 0 otherwise. Lag(MAX_DA) is an indicator variable, which takes the value of 1 if a firm is in the highest quartile of performance-adjusted discretionary accruals and 0 otherwise. Investment opportunities (Q) is measured as the ratio of the market value to the replacement cost of the assets, where the market value is measured as the sum of the market value of the equity (Compustat item 24*199) and the value of debt (Compustat item 9 + 34) and the replacement cost of the assets is measured as the end-of-year book value of assets (Compustat item 6). Internally generated cash flows (CASH) is calculated as earnings before interest, tax, dividends (Compustat item 13) minus interest expense (Compustat item 15), tax expense (Compustat item 16) and dividend payments (Compustat item 127). ROA is measured as net income (Compustat item 172) deflated by beginning-of-year book value of assets (Compustat item 6) in year t. Lag(ROA) is measured as net income (Compustat item 172) deflated by beginning-of-year book value of assets (Compustat item 6) in year t -1. ROA t+1 is measured as net income (Compustat item 172) deflated by beginning-of-year book value of assets (Compustat item 6) in year t +1. ACCRUALS is measured as the difference between earnings (Compustat item 172) and cash flows from operating activities (Compustat item 308).
